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Abstract. This paper reports on the factorization of the 512-bit num-
ber RSA-155 by the Number Field Sieve factoring method (NFS) and 
discusses the implications for RSA. 
1 Introduction 
On August 22, 1999, we completed the factorization of the 512-bit 155-digit 
number RSA-155 by NFS. The number RSA-155 was taken from the RSA 
Challenge list [34] as a representative 512-bit RSA modulus. Our result is a new 
record for factoring general integers. Because 512-bit RSA keys are frequently 
used for the protection of electronic commerce-at least outside the USA-this 
factorization represents a breakthrough in research on RSA-based systems. 
The previous record, factoring the 140-digit number RSA-140 (8], was estab-
lished on February 2, 1999, also with the help of NFS, by a subset of the team 
which factored RSA-155. The amount of computing time spent on RSA-155 was 
about 8400 MIPS years1 , roughly four times that needed for RSA-140; this is 
about half of what could be expected from a straightforward extrapolation of the 
computing time spent on factoring RSA-140 and about a quarter of what would 
be expected from a straightforward extrapolation of the computing time spent 
on RSA-130 [11]. The speed-up is due to a new polynomial selection method 
for NFS of Murphy and Montgomery which was applied for the first time to 
RSA-140 and now, with improvements, to RSA-155. 
Section 2 discusses the implications of this project for the practical use of 
RSA-based cryptosystems. Section 3 has the details of our computations which 
resulted in the factorization of RSA-155. 
2 Implications for the Practice of RSA 
RSA is widely used today [17]. The best size for an RSA key depends on the 
security needs of the user and on how long his/her information needs to be 
protected. 
The amount of CPU time spent to factor RSA-155 was about 8400 MIPS 
years, which is about four times that used for the factorization of RSA-140. On 
the basis of the heuristic complexity formula [7] for factoring large N by NFS: 
exp ( (1.923 + o(l)) (log N) 113 (log log N) 213) , (1) 
1 One MIPS year is the equivalent of a computation during one full year at a sustained 
speed of one Million Instructions Per Second. 
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one would expect an increase in the computing time by a factor of about seven.2 
This speed-up has been made possible by algorithmic improvements, mainly in 
the polynomial generation step [26,29,30], and to a lesser extent in the filter step 
of NFS [9]. 
The complete project to factor RSA-155 took seven calendar months. The 
polynomial generation step took about one month on several fast workstations. 
The most time-consuming step, the sieving, was done on about 300 fast PCs 
and workstations spread over twelve "sites" in six countries. This step took 3.7 
calendar months, in which, summed over all these 300 computers, a total of 
35.7 years of CPU-time was consumed. Filtering the relations and building and 
reducing the matrix corresponding to these relations took one calendar month 
and was carried out on an SGI Origin 2000 computer. The block Lanczos step 
to find dependencies in this matrix took about ten calendar days on one CPU 
of a Cray C916 supercomputer. The final square root step took about two days 
calendar time on an SGI Origin 2000 computer. 
Based on our experience with factoring large numbers we estimate that within 
three years the algorithmic and computer technology which we used to factor 
RSA-155 will be widespread, at least in the scientific world, so that by then 
512-bit RSA keys will certainly not be safe any more. This makes these keys 
useless for authentication or for the protection of data required to be secure for 
a period longer than a few days. 
512-bit RSA keys protect 95% of today's E-commerce on the Internet [35]-
at least outside the USA-and are used in SSL (Secure Socket Layer) handshake 
protocols. Underlying this undesirable situation are the old export restrictions 
imposed by the USA government on products and applications using "strong" 
cryptography like RSA. However, on January 12, 2000, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) issued new encryption 
export regulations which allow U.S. companies to use larger than 512-bit keys in 
RSA-based products [38]. As a result, one may replace 512-bit keys by 768-bit 
or even 1024-bit keys thus creating much more favorable conditions for secure 
Internet communication. 
In order to attempt an extrapolation, we give a table of factoring records 
starting with the landmark factorization in 1970 by Morrison and Brillhart of 
F7 = 2128 + 1 with help of the then new Continued Fraction (CF) method. This 
table includes the complete list of factored RSA-numbers, although RSA-100 
and RSA-110 were not absolute records at the time they were factored. Notice 
that RSA-150 is still open. Some details on recent factoring records are given in 
Appendix A to this paper. 
2 By "computing time" we mean the sieve time, which dominates the total amount of 
CPU time for NFS. However, there is a trade-off between polynomial search time and 
sieve time which indicates that a non-trivial part of the total amount of computing 
time should be spent to the polynomial search time in order to minimize the sieve 
time. See Subsection Polynomial Search Time vs. Sieving Time in Section 3.1. When 
we use (1) for predicting CPU times, we neglect the o(l)-term, which, in fact, is 
proportional to 1/ log(N). All logarithms have base e. 
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Table 1. Factoring records since 1970 
#decimals date algorithm effort reference 
or year {MIPS years) 
F1 = 221 + 1 [27,28] 39 Sep 13, 1970 CF 
50 1983 CF [6, pp. xliv-xlv] 
55-71 1983-1984 QS [12, Table I on p. 189] 
45-81 1986 QS [36, p. 336] 
78-90 1987-1988 QS [37] 
87-92 1988 QS [32, Table 3 on p. 274] 
93-102 1989 QS [21] 
107-116 1990 QS 275 for C116 [22] 
RSA-100 Apr 1991 QS 7 [34] 
RSA-110 Apr 1992 QS 75 [14] 
RSA-120 Jun 1993 QS 835 [13] 
RSA-129 Apr 1994 QS 5000 [2] 
RSA-130 Apr 1996 NFS 1000 (11] 
RSA-140 Feb 1999 NFS 2000 [8] 
RSA-155 Aug 1999 NFS 8400 this paper 
Based on this table and on the factoring algorithms which we currently know, 
we anticipate that within ten years from now 768-bit (232-digit) RSA keys will 
become unsafe. 
Let D be the number of decimal digits in the largest "general" number fac-
tored by a given date. From the complexity formula for NFS (1), assuming 
Moore's law (computing power doubles every 18 months), Brent [5] expects D 113 
to be roughly a linear function of the calendar year Y. From the data in Table 1 
he derives the linear formula 
Y = 13.24D1/ 3 + 1928.6. 
According to this formula, a general 768-bit number (D=231) will be factored 
by the year 2010, and a general 1024-bit number (D=309) by the year 2018. 
Directions for selecting cryptographic key sizes now and in the coming years 
are given in [23]. 
The vulnerability of a 512-bit RSA modulus was predicted long ago. A 1991 
report [3, p. 81] recommends: 
For the most applications a modulus size of 1024 bit for RSA should 
achieve a sufficient level of security for "tactical" secrets for the next ten 
years. This is for long-term secrecy purposes, for short-term authenticity 
purposes 512 bit might suffice in this century. 
3 Factoring RSA-155 
We assume that the reader is familiar with NFS [19], but for convenience we 
briefly describe the method here. Let N be the number we wish to factor, known 
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to be composite. There are four main steps in NFS: polynomial selection, sieving, 
linear algebra, and square root. 
The polynomial selection step selects two irreducible polynomials Ji (x) and 
h(x) with a common root m mod N. The polynomials have as many smooth 
values as practically possible over a given factor base. 
The sieve step (which is by far the most time-consuming step of NFS), finds 
pairs (a, b) with gcd(a, b) = 1 such that both 
bdeg(fi) Ji (a/ b) and bdeg(h) h ( a/b) 
are smooth over given factor bases, i.e., factor completely over the factor bases. 
Such a pair (a, b) is called a relation. The purpose of this step is to collect so 
many relations that several subsets S of them can be found with the property 
that a product taken over S yields an expression of the form 
X 2 ::: Y2 (mod N). (2) 
For approximately half of these subsets, computing gcd(X - Y, N) yields a non-
trivial factor of N (if N has exactly two distinct factors). 
The linear algebra step first filters the relations found during sieving, with 
the purpose of eliminating duplicate relations and relations containing a prime 
or prime ideal which does not occur elsewhere. In addition, certain relations are 
merged with the purpose of eliminating primes and prime ideals which occur 
exactly k times in k different relations, for k = 2, ... , 8. These merges result in 
so-called relation-sets, defined in Section 3.3, which form the columns of a very 
large sparse matrix over :F2 . With help of an iterative block Lanczos algorithm 
a few dependencies are found in this matrix: this is the most time- and space-
consuming part of the linear algebra step. 
The square root step computes the square root of an algebraic number of the 
form IT (a - ba), 
(a,b)ES 
where a is a root of one of the polynomials Ji ( x), h ( x), and where for RSA-155 
the numbers a, b and the cardinality of the set Scan all be expected to be many 
millions. All a - bo:'s have smooth norms. With the mapping a >-+ m mod N, 
this leads to a congruence of the form (2). 
In the next four subsections, we describe these four steps, as carried out for 
the factorization of RSA-155. 
3.1 Polynomial Selection 
This section has three parts. The first two parts are aimed at recalling the 
main details of the polynomial selection procedure, and describing the particular 
polynomials used for the RSA-155 factorization. 
Relatively speaking, our selection for RSA-155 is approximately 1.7 times 
better than our selection for RSA-140. We made better use of our procedure 
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for RSA-155 than we did for RSA-140, in short by searching longer. This poses 
a new question for NFS factorizations-what is the optimal trade-off between 
increased polynomial search time and the corresponding saving in sieve time? 
The third part of this section gives preliminary consideration to this question as 
it applies to RSA-155. 
The Procedure. Our polynomial selection procedure is outlined in [8]. Here 
we merely restate the details. Recall that we generate two polynomials Ji and 
/2, using a base-m method. The degree d of Ji is fixed in advance (for RSA-155 
we take d = 5). Given a potential a5 , we choose an integer m ~ (N/ad)ifd. The 
polynomial 
(3) 
descends from the base-m representation of N, initially adjusted so that la; I ~ 
m/2 for 0 ~ i ~ d - 1. 
Sieving occurs over the homogeneous polynomials Fi ( x, y) = yd Ji ( x / y) and 
F2 (x, y) = x - my. The aim for polynomial selection is to choose Ii and m such 
that the values Fi(a, b) and F2(a, b) are simultaneously smooth at many coprime 
integer pairs (a, b) in the sieving region. That is, we seek Fi, F2 with good yield. 
Since F2 is linear, we concentrate on the choice of Fi. 
There are two factors which influence the yield of Fi, size and root properties, 
so we seek Fi with a good combination of size and root properties. By size we 
refer to the magnitude of the values taken by Fi. By root properties we refer to 
the extent to which the distribution of the roots of Fi modulo small pn, for p 
prime and n ~ 1, affects the likelihood of Fi values being smooth. In short, if 
Fi has many roots modulo small pn, the values taken by Fi "behave" as if they 
are much smaller than they actually are. That is, on average, the likelihood of 
Fi-values being smooth is increased. 
Our search is a two stage process. In the first stage we generate a large sam-
ple of good polynomials (polynomials with good combinations of size and root 
properties). In the second stage we identify without sieving, the best polynomi-
als in the sample. We concentrate on skewed polynomials, that is, polynomials 
fi(x) = asx5 + ... + ao whose first few coefficients (a5 ,a4 and a3) are small 
compared to m, and whose last few coefficients (a 2 , ai and a 0) may be large 
compared tom. Usually lasl < la4I < · · · < laol. To compensate for the last few 
coefficients being large, we sieve over a skewed region, i.e., a region that is much 
longer in x than in y. We take the region to be a rectangle whose width-to-height 
ratio is s. 
The first stage of the process, generating a sample of polynomials with good 
yield, has the following main steps ( d = 5): 
- Guess leading coefficient ad, usually with several small prime divisors (for 
projective roots). 
- Determine initial m from admd ~ N. If the approximation (N -admd)/md-i 
to ad-i is not close to an integer, try another ad. Otherwise use (3) to 
determine a starting Ji . 
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- Try to replace the initial fi by a smaller one. This numerical optimization 
step replaces f 1 ( x) by 
Ji ( x + k) + (ex + d) * ( x + k - m) 
and m by m - k, sieving over a region with skewness s. It adjusts four real 
parameters c, d, k, s, rounding the optimal values (excepts) to integers. 
- Make adjustments to Ji which cause it to have exceptionally good root 
properties, without destroying the qualities inherited from above. The main 
adjustment is to consider integer pairs ji,j0 (with ii and j 0 small compared 
to a2 and ai respectively) for which the polynomial 
fi(x) + (iix - io) · (x - m) 
has exceptionally good root properties modulo many small pn. Such pairs 
i1, io are identified using a sieve-like procedure. For each promising (ii, io) 
pair, we revise the translation k and skewness s by repeating the numerical 
optimization on these values alone. 
In the second stage of the process we rate, without sieving, the yields of 
the polynomial pairs F1 , F2 produced from the first stage. We use a parameter 
which quantifies the effect of the root properties of each polynomial. We factor 
this parameter into estimates of smoothness probabilities for F1 and F2 across 
a region of skewness s. 
At the conclusion of these two stages we perform short sieving experiments 
on the top-ranked candidates. 
Results. Four of us spent about 100 MIPS years on finding good polynomials 
for RSA-155. The following pair, found by Dodson, was used to factor RSA-155: 
119377138320 x5 
-80168937284997582x4y 
-66269 85223 41185 7 4445 x 3 y2 
+118168 48430 079521880356852 x 2 y3 
+7459661580071786443919743056x y4 
-40 67984 35423 62159 3619137084 05064 y5 
F2(x, y) = x - 3912 30797 21168 000771313449081 y 
with s R:J 10800. 
For the purpose of comparison, we give statistics for the above pair similar 
to those we gave for the RSA-140 polynomials in [8). Denote by ama"' the largest 
la;! for i = 0, ... , d. The un-skewed analogue, F1(104x, y/104), of Fi has amax ~ 
1.1·1023, compared to the typical case for RSA-155 of ama"' R:J 2.4 · 1025 . The 
un-skewed analogue of F2 has ama"' RJ 3.8 · 1026 . Hence, F1 values have shrunk 
by approximately a factor of 215, whilst F2 values have grown by a factor of 
approximately 16. F1 has real roots x/y near -11976, -2225, 1584, 12012 and 
672167. 
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With respect to the root properties of Fi we have as = 24 ·32 ·5·ll 2· 19·41·l759. 
Also, Fi (x, y) has 20 roots x/y modulo the six primes from 3 to 17 and an 
additional 33 roots modulo the 18 primes from 19 to 97. As a result of its root 
properties, Fi-values have smoothness probabilities similar to those of random 
integers which are smaller by a factor of about 800. 
Polynomial Search Time vs. Sieving Time. The yield of our two RSA-155 
polynomials is approximately 13.5 times that of a skewed pair of average yield 
for RSA-155 (about half of which comes from root properties and the other half 
from size). The corresponding figure for the RSA-140 pair is approximately 8 
(about a factor of four of which was due to root properties and the remaining 
factor of 2 to size). From this we deduce that, relatively speaking, our RSA-155 
selection is approximately 1.7 times "better" than our RSA-140 selection. 
Note that this is consistent with the observed differences in sieve time. As 
noted above, straightforward extrapolation of the NFS asymptotic run-time es-
timate ( 1) suggests that sieving for RSA-155 should have taken approximately 7 
times as long as RSA-140. The actual figure is approximately 4. The difference 
can be approximately reconciled by the fact that the RSA-155 polynomial pair 
is, relatively, about 1.7 times "better" than the RSA-140 pair. 
Another relevant comparison is to the RSA-130 factorization. RSA-130 of 
course was factorized without our improved polynomial selection methods. The 
polynomial pair used for RSA-130 has a yield approximately 3.2 times that of 
a random (un-skewed) selection or RSA-130. Extrapolation of the asymptotic 
NFS run-time estimate suggests that RSA-140 should have taken about 4 times 
as long as RSA-130, whereas the accepted difference is a factor of about 2. 
The difference is close to being reconciled by the RSA-140 polynomial selection 
being approximately 2.5 times better than the RSA-130 selection. Finally, to 
characterize the overall improvement accounted for by our techniques, we note 
that the RSA-155 selection is approximately 4.2 times better (relatively) than 
the RSA-130 selection. 
Since the root properties of the non-linear polynomials for RSA-140 and 
RSA-155 are similar, most of the difference between them comes about because 
the RSA-155 selection is relatively "smaller" than the RSA-140 selection. This 
in turns comes about because we conducted a longer search for RSA-155 than 
we did for the RSA-140 search, so it was more likely that we would find good 
size and good root properties coinciding in the same polynomials. In fact, we 
spent approximately 100 MIPS years on the RSA-155 search, compared to 60 
MIPS years for RSA-140. 
Continuing to search for polynomials is worthwhile only as long as the saving 
in sieve time exceeds the extra cost of the polynomial search. We have analyzed 
the "goodness" distribution of all polynomials generated during the RSA-155 
search. Modulo some crude approximations, the results appear in Table 2. The 
table shows the expected benefit obtained from "' times the polynomial search 
effort we actually invested (100 MY), for some useful 1c The second column gives 
the change in search time corresponding to the K-altered search effort. The third 
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column gives the expected change in sieve time, calculated from the change in 
yield according to our "goodness" distribution. Hence, whilst the absolute benefit 
Table 2. Effect of varying the polynomial search time on the sieve time 
0.2 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
change in search 
time (in MY) 
-80 
-50 
0 
+100 
+400 
+900 
change in sieve 
time (in MY) 
+260 
+uo 
0 
-110 
-260 
-380 
may not have been great, it would probably have been worthwhile investing up 
to about twice the effort than we did for the RSA-155 polynomial search. We 
conclude that, in the absence of further improvements, it is worthwhile using our 
method to find polynomials whose yields are approximately 10-15 times better 
than a random selection. 
3.2 Sieving 
Two sieving methods were used simultaneously: lattice sieving and line sieving. 
This is probably more efficient than using a single sieve, despite the large per-
centage of duplicates found (about 14%, see Section 3.3): both sievers deteriorate 
as the special q, resp. y (see below) increase, so we exploited the most fertile 
parts of both. In addition, using two sievers offers more flexibility in terms of 
memory: lattice sieving is possible on smaller machines; the line siever needs 
more memory, but discovers each relation only once. 
The lattice siever fixes a prime q, called the special q, which divides F1(xo, Yo) 
for some known nonzero pair (xo, y0), and finds (x, y) pairs for which both 
Fi(x, y)/q and F2(x, y) are smooth. This is carried out for many special q's. 
Lattice sieving was introduced by Pollard [31] and the code we used is the 
implementation written by Arjen Lenstra and described in [18,11], with some 
additions to handle skewed sieving regions efficiently. 
The line siever fixes a value of y (from y = 1, 2, ... up to some bound) and 
finds values of x in a given interval for which both Fi(x, y) and F2(x, y) are 
smooth. The line siever code was written by Peter Montgomery, with help from 
Arjen Lenstra, Russell Ruby, Marije Elkenbracht-Huizing and Stefania Cavallar. 
For the lattice sieving, both the rational and the algebraic factor base bounds 
were chosen to be 224 = 16 777 216. The number of primes was about one million 
in each factor base. Two large primes were allowed on each side in addition to the 
special q input. The reason that we used these factor base bounds is that we used 
the lattice sieving implementation from [18] which does not allow larger factor 
base bounds. That implementation was written for the factorization of RSA-
130 and was never intended to be used for larger numbers such as RSA-140, let 
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alone RSA-155. We expect that a rewrite of the lattice siever that would allow 
larger factor base bounds would give a much better lattice sieving performance 
for RSA-155. 
Most of the line sieving was carried out with two large primes on both the 
rational and the algebraic side. The rational factor base consisted of 2 661 384 
primes < 44 OOO OOO and the algebraic factor base consisted of 6 304 167 prime 
ideals ofnorm < 110 OOO 000 (including the seven primes which divide the leading 
coefficient of F1 ( x, y)). Some line sieving allowed three large primes instead of two 
on the algebraic side. In that case the rational factor base consisted of 539 777 
primes < 8 OOO OOO and the algebraic factor base of 1 566 598 prime ideals of norm 
< 25 OOO OOO (including the seven primes which divide the leading coefficient of 
F1(x, y)). 
For both sievers the large prime bound 1 OOO OOO OOO was used both for the 
rational and for the algebraic primes. 
The lattice siever was run for most special q's in the interval [224 , 3.08 x 108]. 
Each special q has at least one root r such that Ji ( r) := 0 mod q. For example, 
the equation fi(x) := 0 mod q has five roots for q = 83, namely x = 8, 21, 43, 
54, 82, but no roots for q = 31. The total number of special q-root pairs (q, r) 
in the interval [224 , 3.08 x 108] equals about 15. 7M. Lattice sieving ranged over 
a rectangle of 8192 by 5000 points per special q-root pair. Taking into account 
that we did not sieve over points (x, y) where both x and y are even, this gives a 
total of 4.8 x 1014 sieving points. With lattice sieving a total of 94.8M relations 
were generated at the expense of 26.6 years of CPU time. Averaged over all 
the CPUs on which the lattice siever was run, this gives an average of 8.8 CPU 
seconds per relation. 
For the line sieving with two large primes on both sides, sieving ranged over 
the regions3 : 
Ix! :S 1176 OOO OOO, 1 :S y :S 25 OOO, 
lxl :S 1680000000, 25001:Sy:S110000, 
lxl :S 1680 OOO OOO, 120 001 :S y :S 159 OOO, 
and for the line sieving with three large primes instead of two on the algebraic 
side, the sieving range was: 
Ix! :S 1680 OOO 000, 110 001 :S y :S 120 OOO. 
Not counting the points where both x and y are even, this gives a total of 
3.82 x 1014 points sieved by the line siever. With line sieving a total of 36.0M 
relations were generated at the expense of 9.1 years of CPU time. Averaged over 
all the CPUs on which the line siever was run, it needed 8.0 CPU seconds to 
generate one relation. 
Sieving was done at twelve different locations where a total of 130.8M rela-
tions were generated, 94.SM by lattice sieving and 36.0M by line sieving. Each 
3 The somewhat weird choice of the line sieving intervals was made because more 
contributors chose line sieving than originally estimated. 
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incoming file was checked at the central site for duplicates: this reduced the to-
tal number of useful incoming relations to 124.7M. Of these, 88.8M (71 %) were 
found by the lattice siever and 35.9M (29%) by the line siever. The breakdown of 
the 124.7M relations (in%) among the twelve different sites4 is given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Breakdown of sieving contributions 
% number of 
CPU days 
sieved 
20.1 3057 
17.5 2092 
14.6 1819 
13.6 2222 
13.0 1801 
6.4 576 
5.0 737 
4.5 252 
4.0 366 
0.65 62 
0.56 47 
La(ttice) 
Li(ne) 
La 
La, Li 
La, Li 
La, Li 
La, Li 
La, Li 
La 
Li 
La 
La 
La 
Contributor 
Alec Muffett 
Paul Leyland 
Peter L. Montgomery, Stefania Cavallar 
Bruce Dodson 
Fran~ois Mora.in and Gerard Guillerm 
Joel Marchand 
Arjen K. Lenstra 
Paul Zimmermann 
Jeff Gilchrist 
Karen Aardal 
Chris and Craig Putnam 
Calendar time for the sieving was 3. 7 months. Sieving was done on about 
160 SGI and Sun workstations (175-400 MHz), on eight RlOOOO processors 
(250 MHz), on about 120 Pentium II PCs (300-450 MHz), and on four Digi-
tal/Compaq boxes (500 MHz). The total amount of CPU-time spent on sieving 
was 35.7 CPU years. 
We estimate the equivalent number of MIPS years as follows. For each con-
tributor, Table 4 gives the number of million relations generated (rounded to two 
decimals), the number of CPU days d. sieved for this and the estimated average 
speed s., in million instructions per seconds (MIPS), of the processors on which 
these relations were generated. In the last column we give the corresponding 
number of MIPS years d.s./365. For the time counting on PCs, we notice that 
on PCs one usually get real times which may be higher than the CPU times. 
Summarizing gives a total of 8360 MIPS years (6570 for lattice and 1790 
for line sieving). For comparison, RSA-140 took about 2000 MIPS years and 
RSA-130 about 1000 MIPS years. 
A measure of the "quality" of the sieving may be the average number of points 
sieved to generate one relation. Table 5 gives this quantity for RSA-140 and for 
RSA-155, for the lattice siever and for the line siever. This illustrates that the 
sieving polynomials were better for RSA-155 than for RSA-140, especially for 
the line sieving. In addition, the increase of the linear factor base bound from 
500M for RSA-140 to lOOOM for RSA-155 accounts for some of the change in 
yield. For RSA-155, the factor bases were much bigger for line sieving than for 
4 Lenstra sieved at two sites, viz., Citibank and Univ. of Sydney. 
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Table 4. # MIPS years spent on lattice (La) and line (Li) sieving 
Contributor #relations #CPU days average speed #MIPS years 
sieved of processors 
in MIPS 
Muffett, La 27.46M 3057 285 2387 
Leyland, La 19.27M 1395 300 1146 
Leyland, Li 4.52M 697 300 573 
CWI, La 1.60M 167 175 80 
CWI, Li, 2LP 15.64M 1160 210 667 
CWI, Li, 3LP 1.00M 492 50 67 
Dodson, La 10.28M 1631 175 782 
Dodson, Li 7.00M 591 175 283 
Morain, La 15.83M 1735 210 998 
Morain, Li 1.09M 66 210 38 
Marchand, La 7.20M 522 210 300 
Marchand, Li 1.llM 54 210 31 
Lenstra, La 6.48M 737 210 424 
Zimmermann, Li 5.64M 252 195 135 
Gilchrist, La 5.14M 366 350 361 
Aardal, La 0.81M 62 300 51 
Putnam, La 0.76M 47 300 39 
lattice sieving. This explains the increase of efficiency of the line siever compared 
with the lattice siever from RSA-140 to RSA-155. 
Table 5. Average number of points sieved per relation 
RSA-140 
RSA-155 
lattice siever 
1.5 x 106 
5.1 x 106 
3.3 Filtering and Finding Dependencies 
line siever 
3.0 x 10 7 
1.1 x 107 
The filtering of the data and the building of the matrix were carried out at CWI 
and took one calendar month. 
Filtering. Here we describe the filter strategy which we used for RSA-155. An 
essential difference with the filter strategy used for RSA-140 is that we applied 
k-way merges (defined below) with 2 ~ k ~ 8 for RSA-155, but only 2- and 
3-way merges for RSA-140. 
First, we give two definitions. A relation-set is one relation, or a collection of 
two or more relations generated by a merge. A k-way merge (k ~ 2) is the action 
of combining k relation-sets with a common prime ideal into k - 1 relation-sets, 
with the purpose of eliminating that common prime ideal. This is done such that 
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the weight increase is minimal by means of a minimum spanning tree algorithm 
[9]. 
Among the 124.7M relations collected from the twelve different sites, 21.3M 
duplicates were found generated by lattice sieving, as well as 17.9M duplicates 
caused by the simultaneous use of the lattice and the line siever. 
During the first filter round, only prime ideals with norm > lOM were con-
sidered. In a later stage of the filtering, this lOM-bound was reduced to 7M, 
in order to improve the possibilities for merging relations. We added 0.2M free 
relations for prime ideals of norm> lOM (cf. [16, Section 4, pp. 234-235]). From 
the resulting 85.7M relations, 32.5M singletons were deleted, i.e., those relations 
with a prime ideal of norm > lOM which does not occur in any other undeleted 
relation. 
We were left with 53.2M relations containing 42.6M different prime ideals of 
norm > lOM. If we assume that each prime and each prime ideal with norm 
< !OM occurs at least once, then we needed to reserve at least (2 - 1 ~0 )11'(107) 
excess relations for the primes and the prime ideals of norm smaller than lOM, 
where 1r(x) is the number of primes below x. The factor 2 comes from the two 
polynomials and the correction factor 1/120 takes account of the presence of free 
relations, where 120 is the order of the Galois group of the algebraic polynomial. 
With 11'(107) = 664 579 the required excess is about l.3M relations, whereas we 
had 53.2M - 42.6M = 10.6M excess relations at our disposal. 
In the next merging step 33.0M relations were removed which would have 
formed the heaviest relation-sets when performing 2-way merges, reducing the 
excess from 10.6M to about 2M relations. So we were still allowed to discard 
about 2.0M - I.3M= 0.7M relations. The remaining 20.lM non-free relations5 
having 18.2M prime ideals of norm > !OM were used as input for the merge step 
which eliminated prime ideals occurring in up to eight different relation-sets. 
During this step we looked at prime ideals of norm> 7M. Here, our approach 
differs from what we did for RSA-140, where only primes occurring twice or 
thrice were eliminated. Applying the new filter strategy to RSA-140 would have 
resulted in a 30% smaller (3.3M instead of 4.7M columns) but only 20% heavier 
matrix than the one actually used for the factorization of RSA-140 and would 
have saved 27% on the block Lanczos run time. The k (k ~ 8) relations were 
combined into the lightest possible k - 1 relation-sets and the corresponding 
prime ideal (row in the matrix) was "balanced" (i.e., all entries of the row were 
made 0). The overall effect was a reduction of the matrix size by one row and one 
column while increasing the matrix weight when k > 2, as described below. We 
did not perform all possible merges. We limited the program to only do merges 
which caused a weight increase of at most 7 original relations. The merges were 
done in ascending order of weight increase. 
Since each k-way merge causes an increase of the matrix weight of about 
(k - 2) times the weight of the lightest relation-set, these merges were not al-
ways executed for higher values of k. For example, 7- and 8-way merges were not 
5 The O. lM free relations are not counted in these 20. lM relations because the free 
relations are generated during each filter run. 
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executed if all the relation-sets were already-combined relations. We decided to 
discard relation-sets which contained more than 9 relations and to stop merging 
(and discarding) after 670K relations were discarded. At this point we should 
have slightly more columns than rows and did not want to lose any more columns. 
The maximum discard threshold was reached during the lOth pass through the 
18.6M prime ideals of norm > 7M, when we allowed the maximum weight in-
crease to be about 6 relations. This means that no merges with weight increase 
of 7 relations were executed. The filter program stopped with 6. 7M relation sets. 
For more details and experiments with RSA-155 and other numbers, see [9]. 
Finding Dependencies. From the matrix left after the filter step we omitted 
the small primes < 40, thus reducing the weight by 15%. The resulting matrix 
had 6 699191 rows, 6 711336 columns, and weight 417132 631 (62.27 non-zeros 
per row). With the help of Peter Montgomery's Cray implementation of the 
block Lanczos algorithm (cf. (25]) it took 224 CPU hours and 2 Gbytes of central 
memory on the Cray C916 at the SARA Amsterdam Academic Computer Center 
to find 64 dependencies among the rows of this matrix. Calendar time for this 
job was 9.5 days. 
In order to extract from these 64 dependencies some dependencies for the ma-
trix including the primes < 40, quadratic character checks were used as described 
in [1], [7, §8, §12.7], and [15, last paragraph of Section 3.8 on pp. 30-31]. This 
yielded a dense 100 x 64 homogeneous system which was solved by Gaussian 
elimination. That system turned out to have 14 independent solutions, which 
represent linear combinations of the original 64 dependencies. 
3.4 The Square Root Step 
On August 20, 1999, four different square root (cf. [24]) jobs were started in par-
allel on four different 300 MHz processors of an SGI Origin 2000, each handling 
one dependency. One job found the factorization after 39.4 CPU-hours, the other 
three jobs found the trivial factorization after 38.3, 41.9, and 61.6 CPU-hours 
(different CPU times are due to the use of different parameters in the four jobs). 
We found that the 155-digit number 
RSA-155 = 
109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842889\ 
34784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897 
can be written as the product of two 78-digit primes: 
p= 
102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779 
and 
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q= 
106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643. 
Primality of the factors was proved with the help of two different primality 
proving codes [4, 10]. The factorizations of p ± 1 and q ± 1 are given by 
p - 1 = 2. 607· 
·305999· 276297036357806107796483997979900139708537040550885894355659143575473 
p + 1 = 22 . 3. 5. 
·5253077241827·325649100849833342436871870477394634879398067295372095291531269 
q - 1 = 2. 241· 
·430028152261281581326171· 514312985943800777534375166399250129284222855975011 
q + 1 = 22 . 3. 130637011· 
·237126941204057· 10200242155298917871797· 28114641748343531603533667478173 
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A Details of Recent Absolute and SNFS Factoring 
Records 
Table 6. Absolute factoring records 
# cligits 129 130 140 155 
method QS GNFS GNFS GNFS 
code Gardner RSA-130 RSA-140 RSA-155 
factor date Apr 2, Apr 10, Feb 2, Aug 22, 
1994 1996 1999 1999 
size of p, q 64, 65 65, 65 70, 70 78, 78 
sieve time 5000 1000 2000 8400 
(in MIPS years) 
total sieve time ? ? 8.9 35.7 
(in CPU years) 
calendar time "-'270 120 30 110 
for sieving (in days) 
matrix size 0.6M 3.5M 4.7M 6.7M 
row weight 47 40 32 62 
Cray CPU hours n.a. 67 100 224 
group Internet Internet CABAL CABAL 
Table 7. Special Number Field Sieve factoring records 
# cligits 148[20] 167 180 186 211 
code 2,512+ 3,349- 12,167+ NEC 10,211-
factor date Jun 15, Feb 4, Sep 3, Sep 15, April 8, 
1990 1997 1997 1998 1999 
size of p, q 49, 99 80, 87 75, 105 71, 73 93, 118 
total sieve time 340° ? 1.5 5.1 10.9 
(in CPU years) 
calendar time 83 ? 10 42 64 
for sieving (in days) 
matrix size 72K ? 1.9M 2.5M 4.8M 
row weight dense ? 29 27 49 
Cray CPU hours 3b ? 16 25 121 
group Internet NFSNET CWI CWI CABAL 
a MIPS years 
b carried out on a Connection Machine 
